slight update

This commit is contained in:
2024-12-01 04:19:04 +09:00
parent 00b0afd17a
commit 4dbe1bee11
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from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
from Crypto.PublicKey.ECC import (EccKey,
construct,
_import_curve25519_public_key,
_import_curve448_public_key)
def _compute_ecdh(key_priv, key_pub):
pointP = key_pub.pointQ * key_priv.d
if pointP.is_point_at_infinity():
raise ValueError("Invalid ECDH point")
if key_priv.curve == "Curve25519":
z = bytearray(pointP.x.to_bytes(32, byteorder='little'))
elif key_priv.curve == "Curve448":
z = bytearray(pointP.x.to_bytes(56, byteorder='little'))
else:
# See Section 5.7.1.2 in NIST SP 800-56Ar3
z = long_to_bytes(pointP.x, pointP.size_in_bytes())
return z
def import_x25519_public_key(encoded):
"""Create a new X25519 public key object,
starting from the key encoded as raw ``bytes``,
in the format described in RFC7748.
Args:
encoded (bytes):
The x25519 public key to import.
It must be 32 bytes.
Returns:
:class:`Crypto.PublicKey.EccKey` : a new ECC key object.
Raises:
ValueError: when the given key cannot be parsed.
"""
x = _import_curve25519_public_key(encoded)
return construct(curve='Curve25519', point_x=x)
def import_x25519_private_key(encoded):
"""Create a new X25519 private key object,
starting from the key encoded as raw ``bytes``,
in the format described in RFC7748.
Args:
encoded (bytes):
The X25519 private key to import.
It must be 32 bytes.
Returns:
:class:`Crypto.PublicKey.EccKey` : a new ECC key object.
Raises:
ValueError: when the given key cannot be parsed.
"""
return construct(seed=encoded, curve="Curve25519")
def import_x448_public_key(encoded):
"""Create a new X448 public key object,
starting from the key encoded as raw ``bytes``,
in the format described in RFC7748.
Args:
encoded (bytes):
The x448 public key to import.
It must be 56 bytes.
Returns:
:class:`Crypto.PublicKey.EccKey` : a new ECC key object.
Raises:
ValueError: when the given key cannot be parsed.
"""
x = _import_curve448_public_key(encoded)
return construct(curve='Curve448', point_x=x)
def import_x448_private_key(encoded):
"""Create a new X448 private key object,
starting from the key encoded as raw ``bytes``,
in the format described in RFC7748.
Args:
encoded (bytes):
The X448 private key to import.
It must be 56 bytes.
Returns:
:class:`Crypto.PublicKey.EccKey` : a new ECC key object.
Raises:
ValueError: when the given key cannot be parsed.
"""
return construct(seed=encoded, curve="Curve448")
def key_agreement(**kwargs):
"""Perform a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
Keywords:
kdf (callable):
A key derivation function that accepts ``bytes`` as input and returns
``bytes``.
static_priv (EccKey):
The local static private key. Optional.
static_pub (EccKey):
The static public key that belongs to the peer. Optional.
eph_priv (EccKey):
The local ephemeral private key, generated for this session. Optional.
eph_pub (EccKey):
The ephemeral public key, received from the peer for this session. Optional.
At least two keys must be passed, of which one is a private key and one
a public key.
Returns (bytes):
The derived secret key material.
"""
static_priv = kwargs.get('static_priv', None)
static_pub = kwargs.get('static_pub', None)
eph_priv = kwargs.get('eph_priv', None)
eph_pub = kwargs.get('eph_pub', None)
kdf = kwargs.get('kdf', None)
if kdf is None:
raise ValueError("'kdf' is mandatory")
count_priv = 0
count_pub = 0
curve = None
def check_curve(curve, key, name, private):
if not isinstance(key, EccKey):
raise TypeError("'%s' must be an ECC key" % name)
if private and not key.has_private():
raise TypeError("'%s' must be a private ECC key" % name)
if curve is None:
curve = key.curve
elif curve != key.curve:
raise TypeError("'%s' is defined on an incompatible curve" % name)
return curve
if static_priv is not None:
curve = check_curve(curve, static_priv, 'static_priv', True)
count_priv += 1
if static_pub is not None:
curve = check_curve(curve, static_pub, 'static_pub', False)
count_pub += 1
if eph_priv is not None:
curve = check_curve(curve, eph_priv, 'eph_priv', True)
count_priv += 1
if eph_pub is not None:
curve = check_curve(curve, eph_pub, 'eph_pub', False)
count_pub += 1
if (count_priv + count_pub) < 2 or count_priv == 0 or count_pub == 0:
raise ValueError("Too few keys for the ECDH key agreement")
Zs = b''
Ze = b''
if static_priv and static_pub:
# C(*, 2s)
Zs = _compute_ecdh(static_priv, static_pub)
if eph_priv and eph_pub:
# C(2e, 0s) or C(2e, 2s)
if bool(static_priv) != bool(static_pub):
raise ValueError("DH mode C(2e, 1s) is not supported")
Ze = _compute_ecdh(eph_priv, eph_pub)
elif eph_priv and static_pub:
# C(1e, 2s) or C(1e, 1s)
Ze = _compute_ecdh(eph_priv, static_pub)
elif eph_pub and static_priv:
# C(1e, 2s) or C(1e, 1s)
Ze = _compute_ecdh(static_priv, eph_pub)
Z = Ze + Zs
return kdf(Z)

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from typing import TypedDict, Callable, TypeVar, Generic
from typing_extensions import Unpack, NotRequired
from Crypto.PublicKey.ECC import EccKey
T = TypeVar('T')
class RequestParams(TypedDict, Generic[T]):
kdf: Callable[[bytes|bytearray|memoryview], T]
static_priv: NotRequired[EccKey]
static_pub: NotRequired[EccKey]
eph_priv: NotRequired[EccKey]
eph_pub: NotRequired[EccKey]
def import_x25519_public_key(encoded: bytes) -> EccKey: ...
def import_x25519_private_key(encoded: bytes) -> EccKey: ...
def import_x448_public_key(encoded: bytes) -> EccKey: ...
def import_x448_private_key(encoded: bytes) -> EccKey: ...
def key_agreement(**kwargs: Unpack[RequestParams[T]]) -> T: ...

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# coding=utf-8
#
# KDF.py : a collection of Key Derivation Functions
#
# Part of the Python Cryptography Toolkit
#
# ===================================================================
# The contents of this file are dedicated to the public domain. To
# the extent that dedication to the public domain is not available,
# everyone is granted a worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free,
# non-exclusive license to exercise all rights associated with the
# contents of this file for any purpose whatsoever.
# No rights are reserved.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
# BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
# ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
# CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
# SOFTWARE.
# ===================================================================
import re
import struct
from functools import reduce
from Crypto.Util.py3compat import (tobytes, bord, _copy_bytes, iter_range,
tostr, bchr, bstr)
from Crypto.Hash import SHA1, SHA256, HMAC, CMAC, BLAKE2s
from Crypto.Util.strxor import strxor
from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
from Crypto.Util.number import size as bit_size, long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
from Crypto.Util._raw_api import (load_pycryptodome_raw_lib,
create_string_buffer,
get_raw_buffer, c_size_t)
_raw_salsa20_lib = load_pycryptodome_raw_lib("Crypto.Cipher._Salsa20",
"""
int Salsa20_8_core(const uint8_t *x, const uint8_t *y,
uint8_t *out);
""")
_raw_scrypt_lib = load_pycryptodome_raw_lib("Crypto.Protocol._scrypt",
"""
typedef int (core_t)(const uint8_t [64], const uint8_t [64], uint8_t [64]);
int scryptROMix(const uint8_t *data_in, uint8_t *data_out,
size_t data_len, unsigned N, core_t *core);
""")
def PBKDF1(password, salt, dkLen, count=1000, hashAlgo=None):
"""Derive one key from a password (or passphrase).
This function performs key derivation according to an old version of
the PKCS#5 standard (v1.5) or `RFC2898
<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt>`_.
Args:
password (string):
The secret password to generate the key from.
salt (byte string):
An 8 byte string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
This value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly
chosen for each derivation.
dkLen (integer):
The length of the desired key. The default is 16 bytes, suitable for
instance for :mod:`Crypto.Cipher.AES`.
count (integer):
The number of iterations to carry out. The recommendation is 1000 or
more.
hashAlgo (module):
The hash algorithm to use, as a module or an object from the :mod:`Crypto.Hash` package.
The digest length must be no shorter than ``dkLen``.
The default algorithm is :mod:`Crypto.Hash.SHA1`.
Return:
A byte string of length ``dkLen`` that can be used as key.
"""
if not hashAlgo:
hashAlgo = SHA1
password = tobytes(password)
pHash = hashAlgo.new(password+salt)
digest = pHash.digest_size
if dkLen > digest:
raise TypeError("Selected hash algorithm has a too short digest (%d bytes)." % digest)
if len(salt) != 8:
raise ValueError("Salt is not 8 bytes long (%d bytes instead)." % len(salt))
for i in iter_range(count-1):
pHash = pHash.new(pHash.digest())
return pHash.digest()[:dkLen]
def PBKDF2(password, salt, dkLen=16, count=1000, prf=None, hmac_hash_module=None):
"""Derive one or more keys from a password (or passphrase).
This function performs key derivation according to the PKCS#5 standard (v2.0).
Args:
password (string or byte string):
The secret password to generate the key from.
Strings will be encoded as ISO 8859-1 (also known as Latin-1),
which does not allow any characters with codepoints > 255.
salt (string or byte string):
A (byte) string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
This value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly
chosen for each derivation. It is recommended to use at least 16 bytes.
Strings will be encoded as ISO 8859-1 (also known as Latin-1),
which does not allow any characters with codepoints > 255.
dkLen (integer):
The cumulative length of the keys to produce.
Due to a flaw in the PBKDF2 design, you should not request more bytes
than the ``prf`` can output. For instance, ``dkLen`` should not exceed
20 bytes in combination with ``HMAC-SHA1``.
count (integer):
The number of iterations to carry out. The higher the value, the slower
and the more secure the function becomes.
You should find the maximum number of iterations that keeps the
key derivation still acceptable on the slowest hardware you must support.
Although the default value is 1000, **it is recommended to use at least
1000000 (1 million) iterations**.
prf (callable):
A pseudorandom function. It must be a function that returns a
pseudorandom byte string from two parameters: a secret and a salt.
The slower the algorithm, the more secure the derivation function.
If not specified, **HMAC-SHA1** is used.
hmac_hash_module (module):
A module from ``Crypto.Hash`` implementing a Merkle-Damgard cryptographic
hash, which PBKDF2 must use in combination with HMAC.
This parameter is mutually exclusive with ``prf``.
Return:
A byte string of length ``dkLen`` that can be used as key material.
If you want multiple keys, just break up this string into segments of the desired length.
"""
password = tobytes(password)
salt = tobytes(salt)
if prf and hmac_hash_module:
raise ValueError("'prf' and 'hmac_hash_module' are mutually exlusive")
if prf is None and hmac_hash_module is None:
hmac_hash_module = SHA1
if prf or not hasattr(hmac_hash_module, "_pbkdf2_hmac_assist"):
# Generic (and slow) implementation
if prf is None:
prf = lambda p,s: HMAC.new(p, s, hmac_hash_module).digest()
def link(s):
s[0], s[1] = s[1], prf(password, s[1])
return s[0]
key = b''
i = 1
while len(key) < dkLen:
s = [ prf(password, salt + struct.pack(">I", i)) ] * 2
key += reduce(strxor, (link(s) for j in range(count)) )
i += 1
else:
# Optimized implementation
key = b''
i = 1
while len(key)<dkLen:
base = HMAC.new(password, b"", hmac_hash_module)
first_digest = base.copy().update(salt + struct.pack(">I", i)).digest()
key += base._pbkdf2_hmac_assist(first_digest, count)
i += 1
return key[:dkLen]
class _S2V(object):
"""String-to-vector PRF as defined in `RFC5297`_.
This class implements a pseudorandom function family
based on CMAC that takes as input a vector of strings.
.. _RFC5297: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5297
"""
def __init__(self, key, ciphermod, cipher_params=None):
"""Initialize the S2V PRF.
:Parameters:
key : byte string
A secret that can be used as key for CMACs
based on ciphers from ``ciphermod``.
ciphermod : module
A block cipher module from `Crypto.Cipher`.
cipher_params : dictionary
A set of extra parameters to use to create a cipher instance.
"""
self._key = _copy_bytes(None, None, key)
self._ciphermod = ciphermod
self._last_string = self._cache = b'\x00' * ciphermod.block_size
# Max number of update() call we can process
self._n_updates = ciphermod.block_size * 8 - 1
if cipher_params is None:
self._cipher_params = {}
else:
self._cipher_params = dict(cipher_params)
@staticmethod
def new(key, ciphermod):
"""Create a new S2V PRF.
:Parameters:
key : byte string
A secret that can be used as key for CMACs
based on ciphers from ``ciphermod``.
ciphermod : module
A block cipher module from `Crypto.Cipher`.
"""
return _S2V(key, ciphermod)
def _double(self, bs):
doubled = bytes_to_long(bs)<<1
if bord(bs[0]) & 0x80:
doubled ^= 0x87
return long_to_bytes(doubled, len(bs))[-len(bs):]
def update(self, item):
"""Pass the next component of the vector.
The maximum number of components you can pass is equal to the block
length of the cipher (in bits) minus 1.
:Parameters:
item : byte string
The next component of the vector.
:Raise TypeError: when the limit on the number of components has been reached.
"""
if self._n_updates == 0:
raise TypeError("Too many components passed to S2V")
self._n_updates -= 1
mac = CMAC.new(self._key,
msg=self._last_string,
ciphermod=self._ciphermod,
cipher_params=self._cipher_params)
self._cache = strxor(self._double(self._cache), mac.digest())
self._last_string = _copy_bytes(None, None, item)
def derive(self):
""""Derive a secret from the vector of components.
:Return: a byte string, as long as the block length of the cipher.
"""
if len(self._last_string) >= 16:
# xorend
final = self._last_string[:-16] + strxor(self._last_string[-16:], self._cache)
else:
# zero-pad & xor
padded = (self._last_string + b'\x80' + b'\x00' * 15)[:16]
final = strxor(padded, self._double(self._cache))
mac = CMAC.new(self._key,
msg=final,
ciphermod=self._ciphermod,
cipher_params=self._cipher_params)
return mac.digest()
def HKDF(master, key_len, salt, hashmod, num_keys=1, context=None):
"""Derive one or more keys from a master secret using
the HMAC-based KDF defined in RFC5869_.
Args:
master (byte string):
The unguessable value used by the KDF to generate the other keys.
It must be a high-entropy secret, though not necessarily uniform.
It must not be a password.
key_len (integer):
The length in bytes of every derived key.
salt (byte string):
A non-secret, reusable value that strengthens the randomness
extraction step.
Ideally, it is as long as the digest size of the chosen hash.
If empty, a string of zeroes in used.
hashmod (module):
A cryptographic hash algorithm from :mod:`Crypto.Hash`.
:mod:`Crypto.Hash.SHA512` is a good choice.
num_keys (integer):
The number of keys to derive. Every key is :data:`key_len` bytes long.
The maximum cumulative length of all keys is
255 times the digest size.
context (byte string):
Optional identifier describing what the keys are used for.
Return:
A byte string or a tuple of byte strings.
.. _RFC5869: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
"""
output_len = key_len * num_keys
if output_len > (255 * hashmod.digest_size):
raise ValueError("Too much secret data to derive")
if not salt:
salt = b'\x00' * hashmod.digest_size
if context is None:
context = b""
# Step 1: extract
hmac = HMAC.new(salt, master, digestmod=hashmod)
prk = hmac.digest()
# Step 2: expand
t = [ b"" ]
n = 1
tlen = 0
while tlen < output_len:
hmac = HMAC.new(prk, t[-1] + context + struct.pack('B', n), digestmod=hashmod)
t.append(hmac.digest())
tlen += hashmod.digest_size
n += 1
derived_output = b"".join(t)
if num_keys == 1:
return derived_output[:key_len]
kol = [derived_output[idx:idx + key_len]
for idx in iter_range(0, output_len, key_len)]
return list(kol[:num_keys])
def scrypt(password, salt, key_len, N, r, p, num_keys=1):
"""Derive one or more keys from a passphrase.
Args:
password (string):
The secret pass phrase to generate the keys from.
salt (string):
A string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
This value does not need to be kept secret,
but it should be randomly chosen for each derivation.
It is recommended to be at least 16 bytes long.
key_len (integer):
The length in bytes of each derived key.
N (integer):
CPU/Memory cost parameter. It must be a power of 2 and less
than :math:`2^{32}`.
r (integer):
Block size parameter.
p (integer):
Parallelization parameter.
It must be no greater than :math:`(2^{32}-1)/(4r)`.
num_keys (integer):
The number of keys to derive. Every key is :data:`key_len` bytes long.
By default, only 1 key is generated.
The maximum cumulative length of all keys is :math:`(2^{32}-1)*32`
(that is, 128TB).
A good choice of parameters *(N, r , p)* was suggested
by Colin Percival in his `presentation in 2009`__:
- *( 2¹⁴, 8, 1 )* for interactive logins (≤100ms)
- *( 2²⁰, 8, 1 )* for file encryption (≤5s)
Return:
A byte string or a tuple of byte strings.
.. __: http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt-slides.pdf
"""
if 2 ** (bit_size(N) - 1) != N:
raise ValueError("N must be a power of 2")
if N >= 2 ** 32:
raise ValueError("N is too big")
if p > ((2 ** 32 - 1) * 32) // (128 * r):
raise ValueError("p or r are too big")
prf_hmac_sha256 = lambda p, s: HMAC.new(p, s, SHA256).digest()
stage_1 = PBKDF2(password, salt, p * 128 * r, 1, prf=prf_hmac_sha256)
scryptROMix = _raw_scrypt_lib.scryptROMix
core = _raw_salsa20_lib.Salsa20_8_core
# Parallelize into p flows
data_out = []
for flow in iter_range(p):
idx = flow * 128 * r
buffer_out = create_string_buffer(128 * r)
result = scryptROMix(stage_1[idx : idx + 128 * r],
buffer_out,
c_size_t(128 * r),
N,
core)
if result:
raise ValueError("Error %X while running scrypt" % result)
data_out += [ get_raw_buffer(buffer_out) ]
dk = PBKDF2(password,
b"".join(data_out),
key_len * num_keys, 1,
prf=prf_hmac_sha256)
if num_keys == 1:
return dk
kol = [dk[idx:idx + key_len]
for idx in iter_range(0, key_len * num_keys, key_len)]
return kol
def _bcrypt_encode(data):
s = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
bits = []
for c in data:
bits_c = bin(bord(c))[2:].zfill(8)
bits.append(bstr(bits_c))
bits = b"".join(bits)
bits6 = [ bits[idx:idx+6] for idx in range(0, len(bits), 6) ]
result = []
for g in bits6[:-1]:
idx = int(g, 2)
result.append(s[idx])
g = bits6[-1]
idx = int(g, 2) << (6 - len(g))
result.append(s[idx])
result = "".join(result)
return tobytes(result)
def _bcrypt_decode(data):
s = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
bits = []
for c in tostr(data):
idx = s.find(c)
bits6 = bin(idx)[2:].zfill(6)
bits.append(bits6)
bits = "".join(bits)
modulo4 = len(data) % 4
if modulo4 == 1:
raise ValueError("Incorrect length")
elif modulo4 == 2:
bits = bits[:-4]
elif modulo4 == 3:
bits = bits[:-2]
bits8 = [ bits[idx:idx+8] for idx in range(0, len(bits), 8) ]
result = []
for g in bits8:
result.append(bchr(int(g, 2)))
result = b"".join(result)
return result
def _bcrypt_hash(password, cost, salt, constant, invert):
from Crypto.Cipher import _EKSBlowfish
if len(password) > 72:
raise ValueError("The password is too long. It must be 72 bytes at most.")
if not (4 <= cost <= 31):
raise ValueError("bcrypt cost factor must be in the range 4..31")
cipher = _EKSBlowfish.new(password, _EKSBlowfish.MODE_ECB, salt, cost, invert)
ctext = constant
for _ in range(64):
ctext = cipher.encrypt(ctext)
return ctext
def bcrypt(password, cost, salt=None):
"""Hash a password into a key, using the OpenBSD bcrypt protocol.
Args:
password (byte string or string):
The secret password or pass phrase.
It must be at most 72 bytes long.
It must not contain the zero byte.
Unicode strings will be encoded as UTF-8.
cost (integer):
The exponential factor that makes it slower to compute the hash.
It must be in the range 4 to 31.
A value of at least 12 is recommended.
salt (byte string):
Optional. Random byte string to thwarts dictionary and rainbow table
attacks. It must be 16 bytes long.
If not passed, a random value is generated.
Return (byte string):
The bcrypt hash
Raises:
ValueError: if password is longer than 72 bytes or if it contains the zero byte
"""
password = tobytes(password, "utf-8")
if password.find(bchr(0)[0]) != -1:
raise ValueError("The password contains the zero byte")
if len(password) < 72:
password += b"\x00"
if salt is None:
salt = get_random_bytes(16)
if len(salt) != 16:
raise ValueError("bcrypt salt must be 16 bytes long")
ctext = _bcrypt_hash(password, cost, salt, b"OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt", True)
cost_enc = b"$" + bstr(str(cost).zfill(2))
salt_enc = b"$" + _bcrypt_encode(salt)
hash_enc = _bcrypt_encode(ctext[:-1]) # only use 23 bytes, not 24
return b"$2a" + cost_enc + salt_enc + hash_enc
def bcrypt_check(password, bcrypt_hash):
"""Verify if the provided password matches the given bcrypt hash.
Args:
password (byte string or string):
The secret password or pass phrase to test.
It must be at most 72 bytes long.
It must not contain the zero byte.
Unicode strings will be encoded as UTF-8.
bcrypt_hash (byte string, bytearray):
The reference bcrypt hash the password needs to be checked against.
Raises:
ValueError: if the password does not match
"""
bcrypt_hash = tobytes(bcrypt_hash)
if len(bcrypt_hash) != 60:
raise ValueError("Incorrect length of the bcrypt hash: %d bytes instead of 60" % len(bcrypt_hash))
if bcrypt_hash[:4] != b'$2a$':
raise ValueError("Unsupported prefix")
p = re.compile(br'\$2a\$([0-9][0-9])\$([A-Za-z0-9./]{22,22})([A-Za-z0-9./]{31,31})')
r = p.match(bcrypt_hash)
if not r:
raise ValueError("Incorrect bcrypt hash format")
cost = int(r.group(1))
if not (4 <= cost <= 31):
raise ValueError("Incorrect cost")
salt = _bcrypt_decode(r.group(2))
bcrypt_hash2 = bcrypt(password, cost, salt)
secret = get_random_bytes(16)
mac1 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=bcrypt_hash).digest()
mac2 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=bcrypt_hash2).digest()
if mac1 != mac2:
raise ValueError("Incorrect bcrypt hash")
def SP800_108_Counter(master, key_len, prf, num_keys=None, label=b'', context=b''):
"""Derive one or more keys from a master secret using
a pseudorandom function in Counter Mode, as specified in
`NIST SP 800-108r1 <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1.pdf>`_.
Args:
master (byte string):
The secret value used by the KDF to derive the other keys.
It must not be a password.
The length on the secret must be consistent with the input expected by
the :data:`prf` function.
key_len (integer):
The length in bytes of each derived key.
prf (function):
A pseudorandom function that takes two byte strings as parameters:
the secret and an input. It returns another byte string.
num_keys (integer):
The number of keys to derive. Every key is :data:`key_len` bytes long.
By default, only 1 key is derived.
label (byte string):
Optional description of the purpose of the derived keys.
It must not contain zero bytes.
context (byte string):
Optional information pertaining to
the protocol that uses the keys, such as the identity of the
participants, nonces, session IDs, etc.
It must not contain zero bytes.
Return:
- a byte string (if ``num_keys`` is not specified), or
- a tuple of byte strings (if ``num_key`` is specified).
"""
if num_keys is None:
num_keys = 1
if context.find(b'\x00') != -1:
raise ValueError("Null byte found in context")
key_len_enc = long_to_bytes(key_len * num_keys * 8, 4)
output_len = key_len * num_keys
i = 1
dk = b""
while len(dk) < output_len:
info = long_to_bytes(i, 4) + label + b'\x00' + context + key_len_enc
dk += prf(master, info)
i += 1
if i > 0xFFFFFFFF:
raise ValueError("Overflow in SP800 108 counter")
if num_keys == 1:
return dk[:key_len]
else:
kol = [dk[idx:idx + key_len]
for idx in iter_range(0, output_len, key_len)]
return kol

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from types import ModuleType
from typing import Optional, Callable, Tuple, Union, Dict, Any, overload
from typing_extensions import Literal
Buffer=bytes|bytearray|memoryview
RNG = Callable[[int], bytes]
PRF = Callable[[bytes, bytes], bytes]
def PBKDF1(password: str, salt: bytes, dkLen: int, count: Optional[int]=1000, hashAlgo: Optional[ModuleType]=None) -> bytes: ...
def PBKDF2(password: str, salt: bytes, dkLen: Optional[int]=16, count: Optional[int]=1000, prf: Optional[RNG]=None, hmac_hash_module: Optional[ModuleType]=None) -> bytes: ...
class _S2V(object):
def __init__(self, key: bytes, ciphermod: ModuleType, cipher_params: Optional[Dict[Any, Any]]=None) -> None: ...
@staticmethod
def new(key: bytes, ciphermod: ModuleType) -> None: ...
def update(self, item: bytes) -> None: ...
def derive(self) -> bytes: ...
def HKDF(master: bytes, key_len: int, salt: bytes, hashmod: ModuleType, num_keys: Optional[int]=1, context: Optional[bytes]=None) -> Union[bytes, Tuple[bytes, ...]]: ...
def scrypt(password: str, salt: str, key_len: int, N: int, r: int, p: int, num_keys: Optional[int]=1) -> Union[bytes, Tuple[bytes, ...]]: ...
def _bcrypt_decode(data: bytes) -> bytes: ...
def _bcrypt_hash(password:bytes , cost: int, salt: bytes, constant:bytes, invert:bool) -> bytes: ...
def bcrypt(password: Union[bytes, str], cost: int, salt: Optional[bytes]=None) -> bytes: ...
def bcrypt_check(password: Union[bytes, str], bcrypt_hash: Union[bytes, bytearray, str]) -> None: ...
@overload
def SP800_108_Counter(master: Buffer,
key_len: int,
prf: PRF,
num_keys: Literal[None] = None,
label: Buffer = b'', context: Buffer = b'') -> bytes: ...
@overload
def SP800_108_Counter(master: Buffer,
key_len: int,
prf: PRF,
num_keys: int,
label: Buffer = b'', context: Buffer = b'') -> Tuple[bytes]: ...

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#
# SecretSharing.py : distribute a secret amongst a group of participants
#
# ===================================================================
#
# Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com>
# All rights reserved.
#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
#
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
# the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
# distribution.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
# "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
# LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
# CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
# ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
# ===================================================================
from Crypto.Util.py3compat import is_native_int
from Crypto.Util import number
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes as rng
def _mult_gf2(f1, f2):
"""Multiply two polynomials in GF(2)"""
# Ensure f2 is the smallest
if f2 > f1:
f1, f2 = f2, f1
z = 0
while f2:
if f2 & 1:
z ^= f1
f1 <<= 1
f2 >>= 1
return z
def _div_gf2(a, b):
"""
Compute division of polynomials over GF(2).
Given a and b, it finds two polynomials q and r such that:
a = b*q + r with deg(r)<deg(b)
"""
if (a < b):
return 0, a
deg = number.size
q = 0
r = a
d = deg(b)
while deg(r) >= d:
s = 1 << (deg(r) - d)
q ^= s
r ^= _mult_gf2(b, s)
return (q, r)
class _Element(object):
"""Element of GF(2^128) field"""
# The irreducible polynomial defining this field is 1+x+x^2+x^7+x^128
irr_poly = 1 + 2 + 4 + 128 + 2 ** 128
def __init__(self, encoded_value):
"""Initialize the element to a certain value.
The value passed as parameter is internally encoded as
a 128-bit integer, where each bit represents a polynomial
coefficient. The LSB is the constant coefficient.
"""
if is_native_int(encoded_value):
self._value = encoded_value
elif len(encoded_value) == 16:
self._value = bytes_to_long(encoded_value)
else:
raise ValueError("The encoded value must be an integer or a 16 byte string")
def __eq__(self, other):
return self._value == other._value
def __int__(self):
"""Return the field element, encoded as a 128-bit integer."""
return self._value
def encode(self):
"""Return the field element, encoded as a 16 byte string."""
return long_to_bytes(self._value, 16)
def __mul__(self, factor):
f1 = self._value
f2 = factor._value
# Make sure that f2 is the smallest, to speed up the loop
if f2 > f1:
f1, f2 = f2, f1
if self.irr_poly in (f1, f2):
return _Element(0)
mask1 = 2 ** 128
v, z = f1, 0
while f2:
# if f2 ^ 1: z ^= v
mask2 = int(bin(f2 & 1)[2:] * 128, base=2)
z = (mask2 & (z ^ v)) | ((mask1 - mask2 - 1) & z)
v <<= 1
# if v & mask1: v ^= self.irr_poly
mask3 = int(bin((v >> 128) & 1)[2:] * 128, base=2)
v = (mask3 & (v ^ self.irr_poly)) | ((mask1 - mask3 - 1) & v)
f2 >>= 1
return _Element(z)
def __add__(self, term):
return _Element(self._value ^ term._value)
def inverse(self):
"""Return the inverse of this element in GF(2^128)."""
# We use the Extended GCD algorithm
# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polynomial_greatest_common_divisor
if self._value == 0:
raise ValueError("Inversion of zero")
r0, r1 = self._value, self.irr_poly
s0, s1 = 1, 0
while r1 > 0:
q = _div_gf2(r0, r1)[0]
r0, r1 = r1, r0 ^ _mult_gf2(q, r1)
s0, s1 = s1, s0 ^ _mult_gf2(q, s1)
return _Element(s0)
def __pow__(self, exponent):
result = _Element(self._value)
for _ in range(exponent - 1):
result = result * self
return result
class Shamir(object):
"""Shamir's secret sharing scheme.
A secret is split into ``n`` shares, and it is sufficient to collect
``k`` of them to reconstruct the secret.
"""
@staticmethod
def split(k, n, secret, ssss=False):
"""Split a secret into ``n`` shares.
The secret can be reconstructed later using just ``k`` shares
out of the original ``n``.
Each share must be kept confidential to the person it was
assigned to.
Each share is associated to an index (starting from 1).
Args:
k (integer):
The sufficient number of shares to reconstruct the secret (``k < n``).
n (integer):
The number of shares that this method will create.
secret (byte string):
A byte string of 16 bytes (e.g. the AES 128 key).
ssss (bool):
If ``True``, the shares can be used with the ``ssss`` utility.
Default: ``False``.
Return (tuples):
``n`` tuples. A tuple is meant for each participant and it contains two items:
1. the unique index (an integer)
2. the share (a byte string, 16 bytes)
"""
#
# We create a polynomial with random coefficients in GF(2^128):
#
# p(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} c_i * x^i
#
# c_0 is the encoded secret
#
coeffs = [_Element(rng(16)) for i in range(k - 1)]
coeffs.append(_Element(secret))
# Each share is y_i = p(x_i) where x_i is the public index
# associated to each of the n users.
def make_share(user, coeffs, ssss):
idx = _Element(user)
share = _Element(0)
for coeff in coeffs:
share = idx * share + coeff
if ssss:
share += _Element(user) ** len(coeffs)
return share.encode()
return [(i, make_share(i, coeffs, ssss)) for i in range(1, n + 1)]
@staticmethod
def combine(shares, ssss=False):
"""Recombine a secret, if enough shares are presented.
Args:
shares (tuples):
The *k* tuples, each containin the index (an integer) and
the share (a byte string, 16 bytes long) that were assigned to
a participant.
ssss (bool):
If ``True``, the shares were produced by the ``ssss`` utility.
Default: ``False``.
Return:
The original secret, as a byte string (16 bytes long).
"""
#
# Given k points (x,y), the interpolation polynomial of degree k-1 is:
#
# L(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} y_i * l_j(x)
#
# where:
#
# l_j(x) = \prod_{ \overset{0 \le m \le k-1}{m \ne j} }
# \frac{x - x_m}{x_j - x_m}
#
# However, in this case we are purely interested in the constant
# coefficient of L(x).
#
k = len(shares)
gf_shares = []
for x in shares:
idx = _Element(x[0])
value = _Element(x[1])
if any(y[0] == idx for y in gf_shares):
raise ValueError("Duplicate share")
if ssss:
value += idx ** k
gf_shares.append((idx, value))
result = _Element(0)
for j in range(k):
x_j, y_j = gf_shares[j]
numerator = _Element(1)
denominator = _Element(1)
for m in range(k):
x_m = gf_shares[m][0]
if m != j:
numerator *= x_m
denominator *= x_j + x_m
result += y_j * numerator * denominator.inverse()
return result.encode()

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from typing import Union, List, Tuple, Optional
def _mult_gf2(f1: int, f2: int) -> int : ...
def _div_gf2(a: int, b: int) -> int : ...
class _Element(object):
irr_poly: int
def __init__(self, encoded_value: Union[int, bytes]) -> None: ...
def __eq__(self, other) -> bool: ...
def __int__(self) -> int: ...
def encode(self) -> bytes: ...
def __mul__(self, factor: int) -> _Element: ...
def __add__(self, term: _Element) -> _Element: ...
def inverse(self) -> _Element: ...
def __pow__(self, exponent) -> _Element: ...
class Shamir(object):
@staticmethod
def split(k: int, n: int, secret: bytes, ssss: Optional[bool]) -> List[Tuple[int, bytes]]: ...
@staticmethod
def combine(shares: List[Tuple[int, bytes]], ssss: Optional[bool]) -> bytes: ...

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# ===================================================================
#
# Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com>
# All rights reserved.
#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
#
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
# the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
# distribution.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
# "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
# LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
# CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
# ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
# ===================================================================
__all__ = ['KDF', 'SecretSharing', 'DH']

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__all__ = ['KDF.pyi', 'SecretSharing.pyi']